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Abstract 
 
Sri Lankan military forces and government authorities have succeeded to counter measure terrorism by 
defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, their initiatives and efforts to restore 
peace and harmony among different ethno-religious groups in the post-war context are highly complex. 
The additional space given to the reemergence of radical religious groups has negatively influenced the 
process of fostering religious tolerance and harmony, which have been maintained for centuries in the 
country. Ethno-religious minorities became the major targets of religious hatred and violent attacks. At 
both the societal and political platforms, majoritarian religious sentiments and discourse have 
established a dominant presence in opposing the existence and practice of the religious fundamentals of 
minorities. This study has attempted to investigate the nature and impact of majoritarian religious 
violence in post-war Sri Lanka, as well as the efforts made by the government authorities to control them 
in order to foster religious tolerance and harmony in the country. This study argues that religious 
violence under the shadow of religious nationalism has been promoted by many forces as a mechanism 
by which to consolidate a majoritarian ethno-religious hegemony in the absence of competing ethnic-
groups context in post-war Sri Lanka. In many ways, state apparatuses have failed to control religious 
violence, maintain religious tolerance and inter-religious harmony, particularly of accommodating 
minorities in nature. The study concludes that the continuous promotion of majoritarian religious 
hegemony through anti-minority religious hatred and violence would further promote religious 
intolerance and radicalism challenging the establishment of religious harmony in the country.  
 
Keywords: Religious violence; religious nationalism; ethno-religious minorities; religious harmony; post-war 
reconciliation; Sri Lanka 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Religion plays an influential role in human life. The existence and influence of religious violence on 
daily life is also evident everywhere in the world. Particularly, in plural societal context, the 
increased gap in relationships among religious groups results in increased religious intolerance and 
radicalism. Sri Lanka has also been the site for religious violence particularly in the post-civil war 
context. The increased social and political space allowed to the radical religious groups and 
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movements that recalled Buddhist nationalism and hegemony has resulted in more anti-religious 
minority sentiments and violence. This negatively resulted in building religious tolerance and 
harmony in the post-war reconciliation process in the country. Muslims [and also Christians] were 
the major target of majoritarian religious nationalism and the intensified religious violence in this 
regard. Not only the practice of their religious norms and duties but also their religious 
fundamentals and beliefs became highly targeted. Their socio-economic activities were also 
violently targeted as part of the broader anti-minority religious sentiments and hatred campaigns. 
Although the impact of religious radicalism and violence imposed by the Buddhist nationalist 
forces were obvious and gained the attention of human rights activists and forums both locally and 
internationally, the responses of the state apparatus to control or stop the violence and anti-minority 
campaigns particularly against Muslims were very much limited. Therefore, these campaigns and 
violence increased in different forms until the regime change in the early 2015 with the defeat of 
Mahinda Rajapaksa from the office of the presidency. When the new government, the one 
thematically and popularly referred to as ‘Government for Good Governance’ was formed in early 
2015, expectations and hopes increased among minorities that they would be saved from the 
religious hatred and violence of nationalist forces. Also, the regime changes in 2015 appeared to 
have led to a decrease in organized religious violence against religious minorities. However, the 
new regime too failed to express its commitment or initiate any long-term effort to control or 
manage religious violence as well as do justice to the affected parties. Therefore, the religious 
violence continued in different ways even under the well-propagated ‘government for good 
governance.’ Also, there remains a substantial gap in terms of legal action against perpetrators of 
religious violence as to ensure religious tolerance and harmony among different religious groups in 
society. This shows that the state actors continued to be complicit in violation of freedom of 
religions or religious belief against minorities in Sri Lanka (MRGI, 2016). 
Given the above context, this study attempts to assess the nature of religious violence and 
their impact on religious minorities, as well as the extent of state response to control that violence 
or establish communal justice to the affected parties and to strengthen religious harmony in post-
war Sri Lanka. In this paper, a special focus is given to examine religious violence targeting places 
of worship and teaching of Muslim community in the post-war context, as well as counter state 
responses to reconcile grievances and control the religiously motivated nationalist groups. The 
reason for this specific focus on the part of Muslims is obvious that they were the most targeted 
ethno-religious group in this regard and became the most vulnerable in terms of receiving 
protection and justice from the state when they were victimized by religious hatred and violence. 
Though Muslims have a long history of peaceful co-existence, collaborating in socio-economic and 
political affairs with the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority community, they have been seriously targeted 
by the Buddhist nationalist forces in the post-civil war context. This is a serious puzzle that warrants 
academic investigation. On the other hand, the continued increase of religious violence and the 
influence of religious forces in the societal context, and the continued neglect on the part of the 
state apparatus to positively response to the increasing religious violence targeting religious 
minorities leads to the necessity to conduct an academic investigation on how they would impact on 
strengthening religious harmony in post-war reconciliation process–which is lacking in the existing 
pool of literature in Sri Lankan context.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
This study is conducted mainly based on the secondary data. These data are collected from 
difference sources such as academic journal articles, newspaper articles, reports published by 
research centers based on their studies, and different reliable internet sites. These sources have 
discussed the discourses on anti-minority religious sentiments and campaigns and recorded 
number of religious violent incidents staged by radical Buddhist nationalist forces in opposing the 
ethno-religious features of religious minorities, particularly of Muslims and Christians in Sri Lanka’s 
post-war context. Additionally, they have also analyzed the motives of the anti-religious minority 
sentiments and violence instigated by radical Buddhist nationalist forces. The information gathered 
from the above sources on the themes of this study are analyzed, critically examined and reported 
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in this paper in the form of direct quotations, quotations of others, summaries, discussion and the 
authors’ interpretative arguments, all of which support the arguments developed in this study.  
In religious studies, the interpretive approach aims to provide methods for developing an 
understanding of different religious traditions that can be used by students of different schools to 
increase both knowledge and understanding. It sets out neither to promote nor to undermine 
religious beliefs (Sarjoon et al., 2016). However, this approach helps in terms of understanding 
inter-religious thoughts and principles of religious tolerance. In this paper, we analyze the nature of 
religious violence promoted against religious minorities, particularly against Muslims, and the role 
and (in)effectiveness of state actors in controlling religious violence and restoring religious harmony 
in Sri Lanka in the post-civil war context. 
 
3. Major Findings 
 
This study has found that religious violence as part of the political culture of Sri Lanka evolved even 
before independence. Although constitutions in the post-independent era have adopted provisions 
and mechanisms to protect and promote the religious rights of all religious groups, religious 
violence continued to be promoted in different forms by different groups, and socio-political actors. 
The three decades-long civil war also had religious aspects and promoted violence against religious 
fundamentals of ethno-religious groups. It is worth noting that the post-civil war era highly and 
visibly witnessed the motivation of intensified anti-minority religious campaigns and violence, 
particularly targeting Muslim and Christian communities. The following thematic sub-topics present 
and discuss the major findings of this study. 
 
3.1 Nature of Religious Freedom and Position of Religious Minorities in Sri Lanka 
 
Although Sri Lanka is predominantly a Buddhist country, its society is plural in nature. From its early 
history, Sri Lankan society has been a plural in nature consisting of a Buddhist majority, and Hindu 
and Muslim minority religious groups. From the arrival of Western colonials, Christianity also 
introduced in Sri Lanka. According to the country’s recent census (2012), Buddhists form 70.1 
percent in the country’s population while Hindus form 12.6 percent, Islamic followers (Muslims) 
comprise 9.7 percent, and Christians form 7.6 percent (DCS, 2014). In Sri Lanka, Buddhism was 
introduced over 2,000 years ago and given these deep historical roots, most Buddhists believe that 
Sri Lanka is the custodian of Theravada Buddhism (Sebastian, 2012; De Silva, 1981). Hinduism 
has long been existing in Sri Lanka since Tamils argues that they have been living in the country for 
more than 2,000 years and even self-ruling some parts of the country (mostly the Northern region) 
for centuries (See: Rasanayagam, 1993; Britto, 1899). Islam was introduced to Sri Lanka by Arab 
traders in the seventh century (Sarjoon, 2017; Yusoff et al., 2016; Dewaraja, 1994). Roman 
Catholicism and Protestant Christianity were introduced by the Portuguese, Dutch and British, who 
invaded and ruled the island country from 1505 to 1948.  
The Sri Lankan constitution has also adopted provisions to allow and safeguard the religious 
practice of all groups based on international standards. Article 10 of the present constitution (The 
Second Republican adopted in 1978) guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It is 
framed as an absolute right that is not subject to any restrictions. Article 12 of the constitution 
guarantees all persons the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of religion. Article 
12(2) provides “no citizen shall be discriminated against on the grounds of race, religion, language, 
caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any such grounds” (Parliament Secretariat, 2015:5). 
Furthermore, Article 12(3) states that “no person...on the grounds of religion...shall be subject to 
any disability, liability, restriction, or condition with regard to...places of worship of his own religion” 
(Parliament Secretariat, 2015:5). Article 14(1)(e) of the constitution further provides “every citizen is 
entitled to the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching” (Parliament 
Secretariat, 2015:6). This particular provision also embodies the rights of citizens to manifest their 
religious beliefs. However, as Gunetilleke (2012) points out, the distinction between the freedom to 
adopt and hold a religious belief and the freedom to manifest a religious belief is starkly revealed in 
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the jurisprudence dealing with Article 9 of the constitution. Article 9 affords Buddhism the ‘foremost 
place’ and places a duty on the state to “protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all 
religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e)” (Parliament Secretariat, 2015:3).   
The above constitutional provisions favoring Buddhism have been highly criticized by the 
country’s minorities and viewed as one of the major structural factors that contributed to ethnic and 
religious conflicts in the country. These provisions were the major motivating factor of Buddhist 
nationalist forces which induce them to campaign on establishing a predominant Buddhist nation-
state in Sri Lanka, thus challenging the existence of religious minorities. Most of the speeches on 
Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim and anti-Christian campaigns of Buddhist nationalist forces 
refer to these constitutional provisions and urge the government to promote and protect Buddhism 
and its traditional heritage in the country (See: Sarjoon et al., 2016).  
 
3.2 Religious Violence as Part of Ethno-Centric Political Culture and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka 
 
Religious violence is not a post-civil war phenomenon and has persisted over a much longer period 
of time in Sri Lanka. Although Sri Lanka has been a religiously plural country with a history of inter-
religious cohesion, religion had also been a major motive of ethnic politics, ethnic conflict, violence 
and civil war in Sri Lanka, particularly in the post-independent era. The famous place given to 
Buddhism, the major religion practicing by the majority in the country–Sinhalese–in the constitutions 
induced deprivation among other religiously attached minority ethnic groups and thus resulted in 
the development of ethnic conflict in the country.  
Religion had also been a driving force behind Buddhist nationalism and intensified anti-
minority sentiments and campaigns even during the colonial period. During British rule, the 
expansion of missionaries not only facilitated English education but also promoted the conversion 
of local religious groups into Christianity. This was one of the major factors that caused the 
reformists and nationalists to propagate and mobilize public for anti-colonialism, freedom and 
independence. The anti-Christian feelings were high among the Buddhist-Sinhalese nationalists 
and the expression of such feelings in debates as in the Panadura debate of 1862 turned into a 
violent clash at Kotahena in 1883 and the burning of a Catholic Church in Anuradhapura in 1903 
(Pinto, 2013). During the anti-colonial period, the ethnic majority (Sinhalese) expressed their anti-
minority oppositions and sentiment particularly against Muslims mainly for being a religiously 
distinct group and for the improvement of their socio-economic status. This was also one of the 
major motives that induced popular anti-Muslim riots in 1915 (See: Yusoff et al., 2017; Sameem, 
1997; Jeyawardena, 1985).  
In the post-independence era, religion played a vital and decisive role in both the societal and 
political contexts in Sri Lanka. Both major political parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) gave a prominent place to Buddhism that helped the two parties 
to gain power in successive general elections. In fact, there have been much efforts by the above 
two major political parties to move towards a discourse which sought to address, if not to 
manipulate, the outrage among Buddhist the injustices and discrimination against their religion 
under colonial rule (Shah, 2017). Religious elements also underpinned with the intensification of 
civil war by the major actors in Sri Lanka. On the one hand, the major separatist group, the LTTE 
targeted places of religious worship, while government forces also destroyed religious symbols of 
minorities in the war zones, in order to assert Buddhist dominance (Sarjoon et al., 2016; ICG, 
2012). Hundreds of religious worship places belonging to all religious groups became the target of 
terrorist violence as well as military responses during the civil war era of 3 decades. Civil war too 
promoted to reconsolidate a Sinhala-Buddhist state in Sri Lanka, the ideology that was counter-
challenged through advocacy of a separate state concept by the Tamils and the rebel groups 
represented them.  
The establishment of Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) as well as other organizations like the 
Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) within the last decades or so is also significant in terms of role of religion in 
politics as these actors have undoubtedly been influenced in pushing for pro-Sinhalese-Buddhist 
agendas in the post-war politics and development (Shah, 2017). The direct involvement of Buddhist 
clergy in active politics, particularly through the JHU witnessed another surge of Buddhist 
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nationalism that highly opposed the existence and practice of other religions and religious groups in 
the country. It is worth noting that the religious values of Muslims too highly targeted during civil war 
though Muslims have maintained a non-aligned or neutral position among competing forces in civil 
war (See: Yusoff et al., 2014; Fazil, 2005). However, Muslims never resorted to violence or 
separatism to respond to the violent targeting of their religion, and to practice and promote their 
religion. 
In the post-war context, the religion took a decisive role in the process of consolidating post-
war governance as well as territorial integration processes. New religious groups such as Bodu 
Bala Sena (BBS) and Ravana Balakaya (Ravana Force) emerged as to support this process. While 
propagating to promote and protect Buddhism in the country, these forces highly challenged the 
practice of duties and norms of other religions and the existence of religious minorities particularly 
of Muslims and Christians. Therefore, these forces violently targeted places of worship and 
religious teaching, as part of a broader anti-minority religious campaign. The religious violence also 
extended to target the economic establishments of these minorities, particularly of Muslims (See: 
Yusoff et al., 2017; Kadirgamar, 2013). 
 
3.3 Post-War Religious Violence Against Christians 
 
The perception of labelling Christianity as a tool of Western colonialism was perpetuated by ardent 
Buddhist nationalists in the year following independence in Sri Lanka. This perspective led 
Christians to be viewed as ‘others’ and a threat to Buddhism and Sinhalese culture (MRGI, 2016). 
Attacks targeting Protestant Christians gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s which were 
highly motivated or intensified by the nationalist Buddhist movements such as SUCCESS (Society 
for Upliftment and Conservation of Cultural, Educational, and Social Standards). Particularly in the 
new millennium, the JHU started urging the introduction of laws prohibiting religious conversation. 
This was inciting further intolerance against the Christian community in the country. The period 
2003-2004 marked the significant increase in violent attacks against Christians including targeted 
killings of clergy, physical violence and extensive destruction of places of worship and properties 
(MRGI, 2016). 
In the post-civil war period, Christians together with Muslims became the target of hate 
campaigns and violence by Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces. Many Christian churches were 
attacked in 2013 onwards. The attack on a church in Kottawa in March 2013, attacks on two 
churches in Hikkaduwa in January 2014 were notable among them. The Hikkaduwa attacks were 
marked by the visible leadership of Buddhist clergy aligned with the BBS and similar organizations. 
The study conducted by the National Christian Evangelical Association of Sri Lanka (NCEASL) 
shows that reports of 972 cases of discrimination and violence against Christians have filed during 
a period of two decades (1994-2014). Since 2015, 190 incidents of religious violence against 
churches, clergy, and Christians have been recorded by the NCEASL (LBO, 2017). However, 
compared with the attacks on the places of Muslims’ worship and teaching, violent attacks on 
Christians are relatively fewer. Muslims were the major target of a renewed version of Buddhist 
nationalism and newly emergent extreme nationalist groups in the post-civil war era. 
 
3.4 Anti-Muslim Religious Violence in the Post-War Context 
 
The post-civil war era witnessed a radical increase in anti-minority religious sentiment and violence 
in Sri Lanka. Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, which initially focused on dismantling a corresponding 
form of nationalism among Tamils for several decades, focused on Muslims once the war had 
ended (Gunetilleke, 2015). The anti-Muslim sentiments, campaigns and violence were notable 
among the religious hatred and intolerance instigated by the religiously motivated Buddhist groups 
during this period. These violent incidents have also promoted the violation of religious and other 
kinds of rights of Muslims. There had been increased propaganda against the religious 
fundamentals of Muslims such as consuming halal foods, halal food production, religious attires 
such as abaya, hijab and nikab, Islamic sharia (law) based practices such as Islamic marriage and 
divorce practices, polygamy, Islamic banking and financial systems, together with the targeting of 
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places of Islamic worship and teaching such as mosques and madarasas. Targeting of Muslim 
worship places and enterprises were highly influenced in this regard. Religious violence targeting 
Muslims in the post-war context can be categorized as (a) physical violence, (b) destruction of 
property, (c) intimidation, threat or coercion, (d) hate campaigns or propaganda, and (e) 
discriminatory practice. Here, we mainly focus on the physical attacks on places of religious 
worship and teaching. 
The first anti-Muslim physical violent incident in the post-war context recorded in 2011. It was 
an attack on a Muslim shrine of 400-year-old in Anuradhapura, a predominant Sinhalese-Buddhist 
town in the north-central province which is considered as historically significant. This attack was 
accompanied by a mob of more than 100 people reportedly led by Buddhist monks, spearheaded 
by Ven. Amatha Dhamma Thero, who said the shrine was destroyed because the local Muslims 
were trying to turn it into a mosque (Sarjoon et al., 2016; CPA, 2013). Following the Anuradhapura 
attack, the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist forces staged a number of direct violent attacks on 
mosques and other places of worship belonging to Muslims in predominantly Sinhalese areas. The 
shameful attack on a mosque in Dambulla, a predominately Sinhalese town in the north-central 
province in April 2012, was one of the major attacks in this regard. A chief Buddhist priest led the 
attack, with a group of about 2000 people forcefully entered the Dambulla Kairiya Jummah mosque 
and destroyed everything inside. Though there were no casualties, the mosque had also come 
under a petrol bomb attack in the early hours of the morning preceding the mob violence (Sarjoon 
et al., 2016; CPA, 2013; BBC News, 2012). The major justification given by the demonstrators was 
that the Dambulla is a sacred Buddhist area in which no religious practice could be allowed for 
those other than Buddhists. However, according to the Muslim Council, the main umbrella group of 
Sri Lankan Muslims, the mosque building was lawfully registered and 60 years old, and it had been 
there long before the area was declared a sacred zone 20 years ago (Secretariat for Muslims, 
2015; Wickramasinghe, 2014).  
Following the Dambulla mosque attack, there were attacks and anti-Muslim demonstrations 
against the establishment of mosques and religious teaching institutions in many parts of the 
country. Some of the worst incidents include the attacks and demonstration against a Madrasa at 
Dehiwala in May 2012, the burning of the Jummah mosque in Unnichai village in Batticaloa district 
in August 2012, attacks causing damage to the loudspeaker and sound system of the Mohideen 
Jumma mosque of Kohilawatte, Wellampitiya, in Colombo in August 2012, and the burning of the 
inside of the Thakkiya Mosque at Malwathu Lane of Malwathu Oya, Sinha Kanuwa, Anuradhpura, 
in October 2012 (on the day of the Hajj festival), which was followed by a protest demanding the 
removal of the above-mentioned mosque in January 2013 (See: Sarjoon et al., 2016; Secretariat for 
Muslims, 2015).  
Among the incidents reported in 2013, the worst included the defacing of a wall of the Meera 
Makkam mosque in Kandy in the early hours of the morning, the forced closure of a mosque 
(Masjithul Araba) in Mahiyangana after raw pork and stones were thrown into the building during 
Friday prayers on 18 July 2013 (during the holy month of Ramadan), and calculated attacks on the 
Grandpass mosque in August 2013 (See: Sarjoon et al., 2016; Secretariat for Muslims 2015; CPA, 
2013). Religious tensions and violence instigated by the BBS in Aluthgama, a predominant Muslim 
village in the Western province in June 2014 was seen as the crowning event that not only 
challenged the practice of Islamic religious principles but also the existence of Muslims in the 
country (See: Sarjoon et al., 2016). Following these incidents, anti-Muslim sentiments and violence 
gained international attention, including from the United Nations, which intensified international 
criticisms and oppositions to Sri Lanka regarding the violation of religious rights of minority.  
While there were increased criticisms regarding the inability of government authorities to 
control the anti-Muslim violence, Muslim religious places still continued to be targeted. The attack 
on the Meera Makkam mosque in Kandy in July 2015, and attack on a mosque closer to 
Keththaarama, Colombo, on 19 July 2015, attacks on a mosque in Gintoda on 17th November 2017, 
violent attacks at Mosque in Amparai town on 26 February 2018, and the series of one-week anti-
Muslim riots (including targets on religious places) in many Muslim pockets (particularly in 
Udispattuwa, Teldeniya, Digana, Tennakumbura, Pallegala, Kadugastoda, Akurana etc.) in Kandy 
district in February-March 2018 were some of the more recent popular incidents which received the 
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international attention mainly since they were instigated during the so-called national government 
for ‘good governance’ and to lack of state response to curtail the violence and tension  (See: 
Jeyaraj, 2018; Rameez, 2018; Colombo Telegraph, 2017; Sarjoon et al., 2016). A series of anti-
Muslim violence (including attacks on mosques and religious teaching places) instigated by the 
Buddhist nationalist forces and tags following the Easter Sunday attacks in April 2019 attacks are 
the recent examples for how Muslims became the target and victims of Buddhist nationalism in Sri 
Lanka although it is clearly observed that Muslim community was not supporting the groups 
involved in Easter Sunday attacks (See: Farook, 20019; Singh, 2019). These attacks and violent 
incidents impacted on Muslims in number of ways include the killing of few Muslims, the injuring of 
many, the destruction of their places of worship, and challenges to their faith practices and duties, 
and controlling their physical movements with religious identifies and attires. Most of these incidents 
have taken place under the mask of a disgraceful ‘Buddhist-cleansing of Sri Lanka and opposing 
Islamic revival and radicalism’–propagated by the BBS and other extreme nationalist forces 
(Sarjoon et al., 2016).  
 
3.5 The State Response to Religious Violence and Its Role in Maintaining Religious Harmony 
 
Although the religious violence, particularly the anti-Muslim violence, was seriously and negatively 
impacting religious practice and the socio-economic and cultural lives of religious minorities, the 
government authorities were largely ineffective in containing the violence and unapologetic in its 
aftermath, shifting the blame to the Muslims for provoking the violence. The state apparatus (or 
actors) took little action in controlling religious violence and maintaining religious tolerance among 
groups. However, they played direct or indirect roles in supporting or promoting the groups which 
were motivating anti-minority religious violence.  The negative involvement of state authorities in 
religious violence included orders or actions of those authorities that directly discriminates against a 
particular (minority) community member, failure to uphold the victim’s legal rights, the condoning of 
an illegal act, and forcing the particular communities to stop worship or places of worship. All their 
negative interventions led to the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion and the 
right to religious worship and practice.  
It is worth noting that in most cases, religious violence was executed in the presence of police 
(civil security force) officers who did nothing to stop the attack or violence. The role of the police is 
to maintain civil order and peace. In tense situation, the police and military can give prior protection 
to avoid potential violence and their severe impact. But, in Sri Lanka, in many religious violence 
cases in the post-civil war era, the police or military could not do anything to stop the violence. The 
famous attacks to destroy the 400-year-old Anuradhapura Muslim shrine was held in the presence 
of police officers who did not do anything to stop the attack but were just there to observe. To cite 
another example referring to Christian community, the Sunday worship service of the Apostolic 
church in January 2016 in Alawwa was disrupted by Buddhist clergy and a large group of villagers 
who forcibly entered the church and threatened the Christian pastor with violence if he continued 
the service. Later, when the pastor sought to file a complaint with the police, the police officer-in-
charge refused to record his complain (MRGI, 2016). 
On the other hand, the state apparatus, particularly related to the implementation of law and 
order and maintain civil peace in society, have also failed to control or positively tame religious 
conflict and violence. Almost none of those who were directly or indirectly responsible to or 
motivated the religious violence against minorities were not found accused of those incidents or 
brought into judicial review. Particularly, the BBS chief, Ven. Gnanasara Thero propagated anti-
Muslim campaigns that motivated violence on many occasions. He openly opposed and questioned 
the fundamentals of Islam–the Al-Quran and the teachings of Prophet Mohammad. He also 
questioned and threatened the judiciary, religious leaders, even heads of state and government for 
failing to control Islamic revivalism and radicalism. Similarly, there were signs of a potential violent 
incident in Aluthgama, Beruwala when Gnanasara Thero of the BBS made a destructive speech 
against Muslims on 15th June 2014, the day riots erupted in many parts of Aluthgama in Beruwala. 
In this speech, Gnanasara incited the Sinhalese to finish off the Muslims, using the derogatory term 
‘Marakkalayas.’ In the presence of a rousing crowd, he said that “if one ‘Marakkalaya’ lays a hand 
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on a Sinhalese, that will be the end of all of them” (Colombo Telegraph, 2014). In his speech, he 
threatened to destroy Muslim businesses in Aluthgama, Beruwala, and other places. He also 
instructed his listeners to grab any bags with a halal sign and throw them on the ground. 
Additionally, he asked his audience to fight against minorities (Colombo Telegraph, 2014). 
However, he was not found accused of promoting religious intolerance and was brought to the 
review of judiciary. No President, Prime Minister or any Minister of that time had shown their 
opposition against the Gnanasara’s speech or strongly urged the government to act against those 
who responsible for challenging religious harmony in the country.  
The position of police and military forces during the recent anti-Muslim violence in Amparai 
town and in Kandy areas in 2018, and in many parts of Negombo, and in many Muslim pockets in 
Kurunegala district during 2019 April-May violent incidents have clearly indicated the incapacity of 
state response to curtail or control the religious violence. Particularly, in the case of Amparai violent 
incidents, particularly targeting a Muslim restaurant arguing that food contained suspicious 
sterilization pills, policemen were in front of the incidents and did not do anything to restrain the 
mob. In the case of attacks on Amparai mosque, the Police station was less than a Kilometres 
away from the Mosque. The cops had been informed of the attack as the mob arrived on the scene. 
It would have taken the Police only three minutes to reach the Mosque. Yet they arrived leisurely 
after 55 minutes. The mob was still in town then but the Police made no effort to tackle the violent 
elements. Some cops were seen conversing with the mobsters in a jovial manner. It was as if a 
heroic war had been waged and a deadly enemy had been vanquished. A powerful propaganda 
campaign against Muslims in general and Amparai Muslims, in particular, was launched in the 
aftermath of the Amparai violence (Jeyaraj, 2018). In the case of Kandy violence in 2018, it took 
hours and days for police and military forces to come to the targeting places and in many 
occasions, according to many pictures displaced in media, they did not do anything to retrain the 
mob to curtail the violence. The many of the anti-Muslim violent incidents in the post-Easter Sunday 
attacks in April 2019 also witnessed the inability of state apparatus in controlling religious violence 
against Muslims. Most of those incidents were held during the impose of curfew and in the 
presence of police and military forces. The mobsters involved in the attacks covered their faces 
while ban was imposed for covering face for security reasons. In fact, weak institutional governance 
in countries and contexts where atrocities have previously taken place, could create trigger new 
atrocities. Attacks on Muslims by the Sinhalese-Buddhist mobs, whiles units of the police and 
Special Task Force (STF)–both accused of atrocities in the past is chilling reminder of how impunity 
fuels more lawless behavior by those enjoy it.  
While there were serious anti-Muslim campaigns and violence intensified by the Buddhist 
nationalist forces, and there were huge criticisms on the ineffectiveness of government actors to 
control the violence, the politicians and administrators were also directly and indirectly supporting 
these extreme nationalist forces. In March 2013, for instance, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the then 
secretary of defense ministry and one of the brothers of President Rajapaksa, signaled his open 
support for the BBS by attending the opening ceremony of its Buddhist leadership academy. In his 
speech, Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa said that he decided to attend the event after realizing its timely 
importance. According to him, these Buddhist clergies who are engaged in a nationally important 
task should not be feared or doubted by anyone (Gunesekara, 2013). It is highly noted that with the 
change of Rajapaksa regime in the early 2015 and thereafter, the organized anti-Muslim and anti-
Christian violent activities of these nationalist forces have progressively reduced. This clearly shows 
that there was a close relationship between the regime or state actors and the state’s 
ineffectiveness to responses to the anti-minority religious violence and campaigns during this 
period.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
The Buddhist revivalist movements that began in the late nineteenth century in Sri Lanka provided 
much of the impetus for a stronger role of Buddhism in the state and it has been credited with 
transforming and shaping Sri Lankan’s history by favoring the majority and marginalizing minorities 
(Tambiah, 1992). As many noticed, during the Rajapaksa administration (2005–2014), particularly 
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after the end of civil war in 2009, the rapid reemergence of Buddhist nationalism was evident in Sri 
Lanka. Buddhist supremacy was flaunted in television, movies, and newspapers. Moreover, 
Buddha statues were purposely erected in predominant Muslim and Tamil areas in the North-
Eastern region. The military was used to erect Buddhist statues and Buddhist symbols in the newly 
captured territories in the North-Eastern region. Many new radical nationalist forces emerged, 
advocating for the protection and promotion of Buddhism and Sinhalese culture in the country. 
These forces were highly critical of the rapid growth and modernization of other religious 
communities and their influence in the society. Since there has been an increase of reformist 
movements among Muslims and a rapid change of their culture and way of life, these radical 
nationalist forces started campaigns particularly against Muslims and targeted their places of 
worship and religious teaching, cultural norms and practice, and their livelihood activities.   
As Graves (2015) rightly pointed out, we should look at how religious actors imagine and 
apply religion to provide legitimacy to specific political acts and violence. In fact, in Sri Lanka, both 
rulers and nationalist forces have used religion as a hegemonic means to extend their dominance in 
society and hold on to power. The mob violence instigated by the Buddhist nationalist forces had 
other purposes than religion and were often politically organized or motivated. Although there were 
pressures and voices from different forces that necessitated controlling the anti-minority–particularly 
anti-Muslim hatred and violence–so as to restore ethnic and religious harmony in the post-civil war 
context, the rulers and the responsible government authorities have failed to do so, believing that 
through this means they can preserve and sustain their power basis (Sarjoon et al. 2016).  
It is worth noting that the anti-minority sentiments developed and imposed on minorities in the 
post-war context was also triggered by the sense of powerlessness the Sinhala-Buddhist majority 
feel in the global context. Although the Sinhalese form a clear majority in Sri Lanka, they are a 
global minority ethnic group and have long felt surrounded by non-Buddhists in South Asian region. 
This marginalized feeling has created fear and insecurity among the Sinhalese-Buddhist 
nationalists and incited opposition to minorities, so as to safeguard Sinhalese identity and their 
religion. Therefore, historically, religious and political leaders and ethnic entrepreneurs have 
emphasized the fact that Sri Lanka is a Sinhalese-Buddhist country and therefore it is important to 
oppose any threat to Sinhalese and Buddhism in any form and from any source (Sarjoon et al. 
2016). Since the post-war ethno-nationalism has received major support from government 
authorities as a means for them to sustain power, there has been no immediate justice for the 
minorities. Sasanka Perera (2001) has observed that the retelling of history in the Mahāvamsa by 
Buddhist monks characterized wars waged by Sinhalese rulers as campaigns undertaken to protect 
Buddhism and the Sinhalese nation. He claims that these accounts eventually dominated the 
consciousness of the Sinhalese majority and formed an important aspect of socialization in 
contemporary Sri Lanka.  
On the other hand, the constitutional or legal provisions on the protection of religions are also 
weak or contradictory in strengthening religious pluralism and harmony in the country. In the 1978 
constitution-making process, politicians engineered the substitution of the ‘Buddhism’ with ‘Buddha 
Sasana’ having sought input from various Buddhist organizations. The Buddhism clause in the 
constitution is an example how rulers adopted legal provisions to promote the religion of the 
majority and marginalized the religions of minorities. The constitutional articulation of the state duty 
to protect and poster the ‘Buddha Sasana’ while assuring the rights of other religions not only 
appears ambiguous, but also contradictory. This provision has been expansively interpreted in 
many different directions, including the notion that religious freedom cannot be exercised at the 
expense of Buddhism (Shah, 2017).  
The post-civil war attacks on mosques and churches were mainly justified by the nationalist 
groups in that they were built illegally (without proper permission) or they are not officially 
registered. In fact, Sri Lankan law did not require state authorization or registration of places of 
worship or religious bodies. However, in 2008, government attempted to impose a new rule in this 
regard. The new circular on the construction of new places of worship issued by the then Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and Moral Upliftment in 2008 consists of an instruction issued to provincial 
councils and divisional secretaries that the construction of new places of worship requires prior 
approval of the ministry. This 2008 circular has been widely used to support the restriction or 
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prohibition of places of worship of religious minorities. There are also instances where the circular 
was used to prohibit prayer meetings in private residences during the periods of intense anti-
minority religious sentiments and violence. The circular was also used to shut down existing 
churches and mosques or worship services that were not registered with the authority. However, 
the circular lacked any legal basis, and no law authorities or the ministry to regulate places of 
worship in such a manner. The widespread enforcement of the circular illustrated the persistent 
nature of local [unauthorized] actor’s involvement in religious discrimination and violence (LBO, 
2017). 
On the other hand, the newly emerging socio-cultural, economic and political contexts in the 
post-war period has also partly attributed the easy targeting of religious fundamentals and practice 
of Muslims. The civil war itself was actually promoted as to defeat the minorities’ challenges to the 
united as well as unitary nature of Sri Lankan state. Therefore, the fall or defeat of the LTTE–the 
major armed group advocating separate state for Tamils in the North-Eastern Sri Lanka–created a 
competing power vacuum at the societal level. There was no any competing force to oppose and 
act against whatever the pro-Sinhalese government wanted to do in opposing the minorities 
demands. This power vacuum context induced the revival of ethno-nationalist forces, and helped 
them to develop an ethnic consciousness among Sinhalese as to strongly reconceptualize ‘Sri 
Lanka’ as ‘a Sinhala-Buddhist nation’ and ‘a strong unitary state’ in which there is no place for the 
accommodation and advancement of other ethno-religious groups and their demands for power-
sharing and regional autonomy (Sarjoon et al., 2016). The post-civil war regime, considering the 
internal crises within the Muslim political forces, strategically promoted divisions and fragmentations 
within Muslim community and their polity. This compelled the major Muslim political forces to go 
behind the regime and support its agenda. In many cases, when religious violence intensified 
against Muslims, the Muslim political forces have failed to voice towards Muslims and pressure the 
state apparatus to control the violence collectively.   
As a member country in the United Nations Organization (UNO), any government of Sri Lanka 
has the responsibility to adhere and implement the number of resolutions and provisions adopted 
by the UNO and its agencies as to ensure the rights of religious groups particularly of religious 
minorities. The Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires 
states to prohibit hate speeches. Accordingly, any advocacy of national, radical or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. Sri 
Lanka has accepted many human rights related international resolutions and adopted provisions in 
the constitution and laws based on them. However, with regard to the implementation of these 
international resolutions and norms accepted by Sri Lanka and the provisions adopted in the 
constitution and laws on the subject of protecting and promoting religions and religious harmony, 
the more policy reforms and commitment of authorities and officials is needed. Because, the Sri 
Lankan legal framework is confronted with serious challenges with respect to its relevance and 
application to religious freedom and promoting religious pluralism. It is worth noting that progressive 
judgements that vindicate the freedom of religion and protect religious minorities are extremely rare 
in Sri Lanka. Provisions in the law meant to protect religious freedom are used selectively against 
certain minorities who criticize the state and regimes. Meanwhile, perpetrators of hate speech have 
enjoyed impunity or in other words, ‘state patronage.’ This oblique legal framework has 
underscored communal relations and has afforded extremist groups the space to carry out violence 
and violations with impunity against religious minorities. Therefore, the government must pay 
attention to the above concerns in its post-war reconciliation and conflict resolution process 
(Gunetilleke, 2015). Policy adoption and implementation to take strong deterrent action to prevent 
incidents of inter-faith intolerance and make every endeavor to arrest the occurrence of such 
incidents is a must from the government side. Ministries of religious affairs, and law and order are 
highly responsible state actors in this regard.  
In an ethnically and religiously plural country, the commitment of government authorities is 
essential to ensure that law and order are preserved and properly implemented, the lives of all 
citizens, places of their worship and properties would be protected in keeping with constitutional 
provisions to resist practicing or promoting either directly or tacitly any act or procedure which 
discriminate against one religious group or community or favors another. In fact, in Sri Lanka, the 
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failure to accept and address the key issues pertaining to peace, co-existence and religious 
pluralism within the legislative framework has widened the gap in relationship between religiously 
attached groups and caused several violent attacks on religious places, religious practices and the 
much-respected cultural norms of religious groups particularly of minorities in the post-war era. The 
future initiatives and discussions for reconciliations must give urgent priority to the above matters 
and related issues in order to ensure the religious accommodation in post-war reconciliation 
process necessary to build harmonious relationship in plural society.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Religious violence has been a part of the Sri Lankan political culture even before its independence. 
In an effort to establish a majoritarian ethno-religious nation-state, the religiously motivated 
nationalist and political groups induced violence against religious minorities in the post-
independence era. Religious violence was also part of civil war that targeted to undermine the 
religious distinctiveness, fundamentals and places of worship of ethno-religious groups. However, 
the military defeat of the LTTE and the end of civil war created a competing power vacuum at 
societal and political level in the country. With the support of political forces and authorities, the 
major religiously motivated nationalist groups re-conceptualized ‘majoritarian religious hegemony’ in 
the country. The regime of that time also motivated the anti-minority religious hatred, sentiments 
and violence intensified by these forces expecting to continue in power. The result was highly 
negative, and the religious fundamentals of religious minorities and their practice were highly 
questioned and challenged.  
From 2011 up to May 2019, there were hundreds of violent incidents reported targeting 
against religious minorities, particularly against Muslims and Christians. The Muslims were the 
highest target of these religious violence during this period together with serious campaigns against 
their religious fundamentals particularly in terms of ‘anti-halal’, ‘anti-animal slaughtering’ and ‘anti-
Sharia system’ (Islamic law). Killings and injuries of innocent civilians, loss of properties, attacks on 
places of worship and teaching places were the major impact of the religious violence in the post-
civil war context. In many cases, rational justice to the victims was not restored due to the negative 
intervention of state actors, and the lack of law enforcement during this period.  
The regime changing in 2015 indicated that the operation on (or of) religious violence by the 
anti-minority Buddhist nationalist groups would reduce under the so-called Sirisena-
Wickramasinghe coalition or national unity government. This also signaled the less space for 
impunity and organized religious violence in the country. However, it was not an assurance that 
these forces will not repeat their operation in future. In fact, the violence targeting religious 
minorities continued albeit at a lower level for some years and were intensified from 2018. The anti-
Muslim violence intensified in the Gintoda and Kandy-Digana areas were the worse among the 
post-war religious violence while country was ruling by so-called unity government under the slogan 
of ‘Good Governance’ advocating for post-war reconciliation and the restoration of justice and 
accommodation of minority rights. The violence and extremism against Muslims following Easter 
Sunday attacks in April-May 2019 were instigated during the impose of curfew and in the presence 
of government police and military forces which justified that the violence against minorities can 
easily be instigated in the absence of responsive government and state apparatus.  
Until recently, there has been a concentration of threats, protest marches, hate speeches and 
prospect attacks involving in many parts of the minority concentrated areas in the country by the 
radical nationalist forces. The state has a role in controlling or managing them. However, the state’s 
response to control these forces has been relatively ineffective. Even under the so-called 
‘Government for good governance,’ those responsible for the previous cases of anti-minority 
religious violence have not been held accountable. The new government has also not made any 
comprehensive policy measure to control religious radicalism in the country. Inability of state 
(government) apparatus to effectively address the harassment of religious minorities as well as to 
control radical religious movements suggest the tacit approval of the state apparatus for the 
campaigns and violence towards religious minorities. In fact, as happened under the earlier regime, 
the authorities of good governance also show little interest in applying the laws of the country to 
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control the extreme religious forces that are motivating religious hatred and violence against 
minorities, mainly for their political advantages. This will definitely negatively influence the process 
of ethnic reconciliation and religious harmony in the country.  
In any plural society, accepting and accommodating religious and cultural diversity and the 
distinctive features including the religious rights, culture and norms of all communities and groups 
become necessary for maintaining religious pluralism, religious harmony and communal peace 
within that society. There is an urgency for Sri Lankan government authorities and civil actors to 
carefully work on the reconciliation of religious hatred and violence that are highly motivated in the 
post-civil war era against minorities. Ensuring the sustainability of peaceful ethnic relations and 
religious pluralism that had uniquely colored Sri Lankan societal and political history highly depends 
on the necessary law and policy reforms and their rational implementation, as part of the broader 
post-war reconciliation process.   
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